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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF
MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION LAW
WALLACE MENDELSON*

The Fringe Problem
"In considering the annexation of territory, it may be likened in rural
parlance, to a well-fed milk cow whose head is feeding from the manger,
which is the parent city supplying the feed, but whose body is largely
in the areas proposed to be annexed, and whose milk is yielded and drawn
therein. Continuing the analogy, it would seem desirable to have the
whole cow under one jurisdiction that she might be properly looked
after, nourished, stabled, and cared for, and if veterinary services be
needed, instead of having two veterinarians, one for the head and one
for the, body, not always working together or in harmony, have one
veterinarian whose skill and ability would best promote, not only the
particular but the general welfare of the cow." Henrico County v.
Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 760, 15 S.E.2d 309 (1941),.

World War II aggravated one of our most troublesome municipal

problems-the growth of urban fringe areas around the outskirts
of towns and cities. Many municipalities are finding their natural

development either frustrated or completely strangled by choker
necklaces of satellite settlements. Parent cities are surrounded by
slum areas which they cannot control and wealthy suburban sections
which they cannot tax. For it is common that the poorest and the most
prosperous tend to live in the outskirts-the former to avoid the
sanitation and anti-nuisance standards of urban life, the latter to
escape their share of the cost of government in the mother city where
they earn their livelihood. In short, for all practical purposes of
everyday life, the fringe is a part of the mother city's social and
economic existence, yet it is beyond her regulatory and taxing jurisdiction. Thus the suburbanites are able to enjoy the benefits of urban
life and to avoid many of its burdens. Conversely, city dwellers bear
the major cost of municipal facilities which the outsiders enjoy and
are also compelled to pay county taxes-often a major share of them
*Professor of Political Science, The University of Tennessee. Special Consultant, Municipal Technical Advisory Service.
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-that inure primarily for the benefit of fringe dwellers. Only if the
whole metropolitan region can be treated as the socio-economic unit,
which in fact it is, can fringe slums be controlled and tax burdens
equalized.
Of course these evils show up most clearly in large metropolitan
areas, but in fact the problem is ubiquitous. Indeed it is so common
that a standard pattern of its origins and growth may be discerned.'
First a few scattered families move into what is essentially rural territory at the outskirts of a healthy town or city. Such rudimentary
services as counties normally provide are adequate for a time. Then
as population density in the area increases the need for urban-type
police and fire protection, garbage collection, sanitary and storm
sewers, building inspection, zoning protection, traffic control and recreation and health facilities begins to be felt. Gradually the fringedwellers realize that they are in fact an urban community in need of
urban services. But the county is not fitted either psychologically or
structurally to provide them. The result is a slow multiplication of
special districts and private or semi-private agencies each providing
a separate facility until the suburbanite begins to wonder whether he
is not paying too much for too little. Soon here and there segments
of what is really a single urban center splinter off to incorporate as
separate municipalities.
Meanwhile the fringe becomes more and more a menace to the
healthy growth of the mother town. It is not merely physical confinement that is involved. Suburban slums magnify the costs and problems of municipal fire, police and health departments. The area as a
whole loses its fair share of such federal and state funds as are allocated on a municipal population basis. Plush satellite settlements not
only drain cream off the municipal tax base, but deprive the city of
something which in the long run is more important. As a character
in Livingston Biddle's Main Line puts it, "The old families, the ones
who helped build up this metropolis-where do most of them live
now? Out ... in some nice cozy suburb. Sure the men work in the

city, but they've lost touch with it, with what goes on inside. And
by and large they don't care .... "
The final stage in the fringe cycle comes with the sudden realization
by the community as a whole that it has a fringe problem. But by
then it is usually one that can no longer be solved short of the most
heroic measures. Bureau of the Census figures tell the whole bleak
story in direct and simple terms. "Urbanized areas" outside of our
cities are growing in population more than twice as fast as our cities
1. See Roterus and Hughes, Governmental Problems of Fringe Areas, 30
PUBLIC MANAGEmENT 93, 94 (1948).
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themselves!2 One basic solution for such difficulties is an annexation
program commensurate with the needs of our expanding communities. Ideally, of course, municipalities would keep ahead of the problem by annexing shelter belts to anticipate all possible suburban
growth. This unfortunately is seldom done. As a result, most lively
towns and cities are faced with established out-skirt communities, the
annexation and integration of which raise serious legal and fiscal difficulties.
Tennessee Annexation Law
In the past the extension of municipal boundaries in Tennessee has
been accomplished largely by private act of the state legislature.
But a recent constitutional amendment clearly forecloses that device
with respect to home-rule municipalities and possibly with respect to
all others as well. 3 But even if ultimately it is held that non-homerule towns and cities may still have their boundaries extended by
private act, the new restrictions on all such measures would seem
as a practical matter to impede that limited avenue of escape. Nor
is there any real hope for relief in existing general legislation 4 For
under it neither a municipality, nor any of its residents, may initiate
annexation proceedings. That may be done only by petition of fifty
resident freeholders of the area to be annexed. Not only does this
preclude annexation of totally uninhabited shelter belts in anticipation of fringe problems, it virtually guarantees that areas selected for
annexation will have to be mapped out for gerrymandering purposes
rather than for the needs of the urban community. This difficulty of
course may be compounded to the extent that fringe area property
is held by corporations and by non-resident freeholders. Moreover
it is clear that the interests of the limited class eligible to petition will
not necessarily coincide with municipal interests, nor even with the
interests of most fringe-dwellers. Of course municipalities may veto
annexation petitions, so apparently may the "electors" of the affected
out-skirts. But no multiplication of negatives can be expected to
meet the affirmative needs of all interested parties. Finally there are
no statutory provisions in Tennessee annexation law for the handling
2. For an interesting summary of the figures see Jones, Metropolitan and
Boox 1953 27 (1953).

Urbanized Areas, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR

3. Amendment No. 7 (1953), authorizing optional home rule for cities, provides that the "General Assembly shall by general law provide the exclusive
methods by which . . . municipal boundaries may be altered."

Perhaps this

limitation will be held to apply only to home rule cities. Thus other municipalities could have their boundaries altered by private act subject to the
limits provided in Amendment No. 6 (1953). See Hunt, ConstitutionalLaw1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAwD. L. REv. 763, 768-71 (1954).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3320, 3321 (Williams 1934).
5. What "qualified voters" and "electors" are referred to in Section 3321
of the Code of Tennessee? Is an absolute majority required or merely a
majority of those who vote?
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of public property or obligations relating to territory passing by annexation from a county or special district to a municipality.
Annexation Laws in Other States
While a few states still rely upon the private act system, most of
them provide for the extension of municipal boundaries by general
legislation. The typical approach is a two step system of petition and
approval, each of which may be accomplished by one, or a combination, of the following: a city, a specified part of its qualified voters,
or all or part of the property owners, residents or qualified voters of
the area to be annexed. The stumbling block is that usually in one
form or another the outsiders have the power to kill any proposaland experience suggests that in exercising it they are more apt to
think in terms of next year's tax rate than of the long-range welfare
6
of the entire urban community.
As though in answer to such difficulties the State of Virginia has
shunted the whole vexing problem of municipal boundary extension
over to its courts.7 Proceedings may be instituted either by city
ordinance or by a majority of the qualified voters in the territory to
be annexed. The matter is then heard by a specially constituted court
consisting of the circuit judges of the county and city involved plus
a third judge from a "remote" circuit to be designated by the state's
Chief Justice. "Such court shall hear the case upon the evidence introduced in the manner in which evidence is introduced in common
law cases, and shall ascertain and determine the necessity for and
expedience of annexation, considering the best interests of the county,
the city and the best interests, services to be rendered and needs of
the area proposed to be annexed and the best interests of the remaining portion of the county, and whether the terms and conditions set
forth in the ordinance are reasonable and fair, and whether fair and
just provisions are made for the future management of such territory
and the rendering of needed services.""
The court may issue an order granting, denying or modifying the
proposed annexation terms in accordance with its findings in relation
to the indicated standards. But in addition "The court shall so draw
the lines of annexation as to have a reasonably compact body of land,
and shall also see that no land shall be taken into the city which is not
6. KNEiER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,

355-57 (1947). For an

analysis of "Laws of the States Relating to the Annexation of County Territory-A Summary Statement," see study under that title by John Harris,
published in 1952 by the Bureau of Public Administration of The University
of Tennessee (mimeographed). Provisions with respect to the handling of
the public property and obligations of the annexee government relating to
the territory removed from it are sparse. Where the matter is dealt with at
all, there is apt to be no more than a provision for some form of pro-rata
allocation of county indebtedness to annexing municipalities.
7. VA. CODE §§ 15-125 through 15-161, 15-358 (1950).
8. Id., § 135.
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adapted to city improvements, unless necessarily embraced, in such
compact body of land, or which the city shall not need in the reasonably near future for development. In making its decision as to the
character and extent of annexation the court shall take into consideration as well, not only the development of the city but also the loss
of revenue to the county and the effect that annexation may have upon
the revenues-of the city and of the county."9
Clearly much more is involved here -than judicial review. The
Virginia legislature has simply delegated its primary annexation
authority to the judiciary. While Virginia judges have been willing
to accept and exercise it, such unmitigated devolution of non-judicial
power to the courts in other jurisdictions would certainly invite
trouble.'0
But while Virginia's system is the most elaborate, other states,
notably Arkansas, Nebraska and Wyoming, have Virginia-type legislation giving courts primary annexation authority with respect to
some or all municipalities. In each case interested parties may petition specified regular courts. The Arkansas statute requires the granting of such petitions as meet specified, objective conditions, if to do
so "be deemed right and proper, in the judgment and discretion of the
court ...."1 The Nebraska statute provides with respect to cities of
the first class that, "If the court find the allegations of the petition
to be true [with respect, inter alia, to the "material benefits and advantages to be derived from . .. annexation"], and that such territory,
or any part thereof, not smaller in area than as hereinbefore required,
would receive material benefit by its annexation to such city, or that
justice and equity require such annexation . . . a decree shall be
entered accordingly."'12 In Wyoming the court "shall hear the testimony offered for or against annexation, and if, after inspection of the
[required] map and the testimony heard, [it] is of the opinion that the
prayer of such petition should be granted, it shall make an order to
-l13
that effect ....
Another somewhat unusual way to deal with extra-municipal urban
growth has been tried in Nebraska, Texas and Missouri. In the two
9. Ibid.

10. See Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 124 Va. 639, 98 S.E. 755 (1919) and

compare Rutland v. Augusta, 120 Kan. 42, 242 Pac. 456 (1926); North v. Bd.

of Education, 313 Ill. 422, 145 N.E. 158 (1924); In re Beneke, 105 Minn. 84, 117
N.W. 157 (1908); Searle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226 N.W. 464 (1929); In rel

Incorporation of N. Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N.W. 1033 (1911); Udall v.
Severn, 52 Ariz. 65, 79 P.2d 347 (1938).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-103 (1947).

12. NEB.REV. STAT. § 16-108 (1943).
13. WYo. COMP. STAT. § 29-1207 (1945). See also OKLA. STAT. §§ 11-485,
11-486 (1951), which authorize judicial intervention at the instance of suburbanites whose petition to a city for annexation has not been granted. "If upon
hearing the court shall find that the request of petitioners ought to be granted
and can be so granted without injustice to the inhabitants or persons interested,
the court shall so order."
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latter states home-rule cities, at least, may annex unincorporated,
adjacent territory by charter amendment. 14 In addition Texas homerule cities whose charters so provide 15 and Nebraska cities of the
metropolitan class'1 may acquire territory by simple ordinance. If
some cities are to be trusted with such powers there seems to be no
reason in principle for denying it to others. The Texas "experiment"
has caused substantial local controversy, but there is reason to believe the unilateral annexing power of its home-rule cities has not
been abused. 17 New brooms are apt to be "controversial" merely
because they are new-just as they are apt at first to be used with
unaccustomed enthusiasm. It is noteworthy that despite the clamor
of "suburban dwellers opposed to city taxes; economic interests antagonistic to regulation and more taxes; and petty politicians who
have a stake in the local status quo",'8 the Texas legislature, although
it has had ample opportunity to limit the annexing power of homerule cities, has not yet seen fit to do so. 19 Absence of comparable
"controversy" in Missouri and Nebraska suggests that Texas "difficulties" are more closely associated with strains and insecurities resulting
from its peculiar post-war urban-industrial boom than with its annexation procedures as such.
But notwithstanding the lack of express statutory provision for it,
the self-extension power of Texas, Missouri and Nebraska cities is
subject to judicial review on "reasonableness" grounds. In all three
states the courts have recognized that annexation is essentially a
political question and have shown a high degree of deference for
municipal (i.e. political) action.2 0 As the Missouri Supreme Court
has said, "It was not for the trial court to decide whether, upon the
facts shown to exist, the extension of the boundaries was necessary,
but to determine whether or not, upon the facts shown to exist, reasonable men would differ as to the necessity of the extension. If the
question of whether or not the territory involved should be included
within the city limits was fairly debatable, that is, if there was substantial evidence each way so that reasonable men would differ about
14. Eastham v. Steinhager, 111 Tex. 597, 243 S.W. 457 (1922) and State ex
inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.
2d 762 (1950).

15. City of Houston v. Texas, 142 Tex. 190, 176 S.W.2d 928 (1943).
REV. STAT. § 14-117 (1943). Omaha apparently is the only city in
this class.
17. See Spain, Recent Municipal Annexation in Texas, 29 SOUTHWESTERN
SOCIAL SCINxCE Q. 299 (1949) and Politics of Recent Municipal Annexation in
16. NE.

Texas, 30 Id. 18 (1949).
18. Spain, Recent Municipal Annexation in Texas, 29 SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL
SCIENCE Q. 299 (1949).

19. ". .. the Legislative Council of Texas has been requested to study the
problem of city expansion and report its findings to the legislature in 1955."
Claunch, Land Grabbing-Texas Style, 42 NAT. MuNic. REV. 494, 496 (1953).
20. City of Houston v. State, 142 Tex. 190, 176 S.W.2d 928 (1943); State ex
inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. N. Kansas City, 360 Kan. 374, 228 S.W.2d
762 (1950); Wagner v. Omaha, 156 Neb. 163, 55 N.W.2d 490 (1952).
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its necessity, then the decision of that question was for the city
council and the city electorate and not for the court. When the evidence shows a fairly debatable question about the matter, then neither
21
way the question might be decided would be unreasonable."
Similarly Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico and
Ohio permit unilateral annexation by some or all cities, but unlike
Nebraska, Missouri and Texas have express statutory provisions for
some form of judicial review. In Indiana all but first-class cities may
annex by ordinance, but any aggrieved person may file a remonstrance in court stating "the reason why such annexation ought not
in justice take place." After a hearing without a jury the court "shall
give judgment upon the question of such annexation according to the
evidence which either party may introduce relevant to the issue. If
the court should be satisfied . . . [that] less than fifty-one (51) per
cent of the persons owning property in the territory sought to be
annexed, have remonstrated, and that the adding of such territory
to the city will be for its interest and will cause no manifest injury
to the persons owning property in the territory sought to be annexed
. .annexation shall take place." If the court should find that fiftyone per cent or more owners of property in the annexee territory have
remonstrated, annexation shall not take place "unless the court shall
find ... that the prosperity of such city and territory will be materially
retarded and the safety of the inhabitants and property thereof en'22
dangered without such annexation.
The general pattern of Kentucky procedure is similar to Indiana's;
their provisions for judicial review are virtually identical.23 Mississippi legislation authorizes appeals to the courts to "be tried on an
issue to be made up there, and the question shall be whether the
proposed . . .extension . . .be or be not unreasonable. 2 4 In New
Mexico territory "contiguous on two (2) or more sides of any municipality . . .platted into tracts containing five (5) acres or less... substantially built up, and [having] two (2) or more business or commercial establishments thereon and [whose] inhabitants . . . are
enabled to secure the benefits of city or town government in police
and fire protection, or could be furnished with light and water by said
city or town, or under a franchise granted thereby" may be annexed
by resolution of such municipality. But any aggrieved owner of
property in the territory in question may have a court hear evidence
and "determine whether the conditions hereinabove set forth exist,
and enter its judgment accordingly. . ."2 Florida and Ohio legisla*

".

21. State ex inf. Mallet ex rel. Womack v. Joplin, 332 Mo. 1193, 1205, 62
S.W.2d 393, 398 (1933).
22. IND. ANW. STAT. § 48-702 (Burns 1950).
23. KY. R v.STAT. § 81.110 (1948).
24. Miss. CoDE Aim. § 3379 (1942).
25. N. MEx. STAT. ANN.§ 14-603 (1941).
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tion authorizes -injunctions or the equivalent upon petition of interested persons to stop annexation proceedings, but no standards for
such judicial -action are provided.26
Clearly most of these provisions supply very little guidance for
the reviewing courts to which they are addressed. Indeed for the
most part the standards provided are susceptible of so many different
meanings in the context in which they are used as to raise serious
doubts as to whether'they do not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. 27 Nor is there a ready cure.
For, at best, any attempt to be more precise would risk trouble at the
other extreme-failure to anticipate and provide for the myriad and
viable, considerations implicit in the fringe problem. But the difficulty is more than a mere matter of draftsmanship. Annexation
requires the resolution of conflicts of values, the elements of which
are largely imponderable. Essentially what is involved are the peculiar attitudes, fears, hopes and fancies of*the various elements in each
particular county-fringe-town composit. Such matters are inherently
political in nature. To attempt by some form of words to convert them
into legal issues is to repudiate the essence of the separation of powers.
To be sure some aspects of annexation clearly are susceptible of settlement by the judicial process. The point is simply that the basic "ought
it be done" question is inherently political in nature.
Suggestions for New Annexation Legislation
In addition to private legisltion still relied upon in a few jurisdictions, we have noted three basic approaches to the discrepancy between the "real" and the legal boundaries of American cities. The
most common system makes annexation depend upon the separate
approval of both the city and the fringe area in question. This permits the tail to wag the dog for in the typical setting it allows the
few (fringe voters or property owners) to block the wishes of the
many. Democratic decency requires the opposite; just as it requires
that such issue be decided by voters rather than property holders! As
the highest court of Virginia has said, ".

.

. it is no answer to an

annexation proceeding to assert that individual residents of the
county do not need or desire the governmental services rendered by
the city. A county resident may be willing to take a chance on police,
fire and health protection, and even tolerate the inadequacy of sew26. FLA. STAT. § 171.04 (1951); Oxio REV. CODE §§ 709.07-709.09 (Baldwin
See also Pa. Laws 1953, c. 145.
27. A lower Ohio court has held under the provisions above referred to
that the weighing of the various factors in connection with a proposed annexation of territory is a political rather than a judicial function and in a suit
to enjoin annexation the court will not consider the merits, but only the legality
of the proceedings. Pikleheimer v. Urner, 29 Ohio N.P. (N.s.) 547 (19-).
1953).
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*age, water and garbage service: As long-as he lives in ,h isolated
situation his desire for lesser'services and cheaper government may
be acquiesced in with complacency, but when the movement of
population has made him [or. threatens to make him] a"part of a
compact urban community, his individual preferences, can no longer
be permitted to prevail. It is-not so much that he needs the city government, as it is that the area in which he lives needs it."?"
To subject annexation proposals to popular vote aAd" to give ihe
same weight to each city and fringe area ballot of course will normally give the city view an advantage' But this ;apprbach:is not
necessarily hopeless from the outsider's point of view . Forlt means.
that when city voters are closely divided, i.e., when theii'ahswer to the
'particular problem at issue is not cla'r, the outsideis' 'may hold the.
balance of power. To be sure annexation proposals may 'be rigged,
i.e., gerrymandered, to reduce the effectiveness of the"suburban vote.
This might be obviated by a requirement that suburbaii communities
be taken as a whole or not at all, or' that only'a limited number of
annexations per city would be permissible in a given-period of time.
But such limitations would be dangerous. The formei would present
vexatious problems of definition and enforcement and might impose
burdens that no city could wisely undertake. The time limitation
would make for inflexibility and would give the enemies of annexation a dangerous weapon-innocuous annexations could be used to.
block important ones. Experience teaches that to put such weapons
in suburban hands is to perpietuate fringe evils. On these premises.
Proposal I (see Appendix) is presented is an orthodox-type annexation measure. It will be noted that while' in one version referendum
elections are compulsory, in the alternate provision they are requiredonly if requested by petition of one-ihird of the voters of the territory
to be annexed. Thus in'the absence of substantial 'resistance by the
affected suburbanites voting expenses could be avoided. For comment
on the settlement-of-disputes provisions of this pr6posal see belovW.
Of course such legislation would be subject to whatever degree
of judicial review courts might see fit, to impose. If it be deemed.
desirable to limit or foreclose judicial intervention, provisions to
that effect could be included for such weight as they might carry
in court. The "provision with respect to smaller and larger municipalities is designed to forestall suburban attempts to ward off annexation by counter-annexation nuisance tactics.
For reasons already indicated delegation of primary annexation
power directly to the judiciary, as in Virginia, would be vulnerable
in many jurisdictions. But even if the courts in other states might
28. Henrico County v. Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309, 321 (1941).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

prove willing to accept and exercise such power, they should not be
asked to do so. For to embroil them in what are essentially political
controversies is to enervate both the judicial and political processes
-especially is this a danger when judges are chosen by popular
election (as they are not in Virginia).
There are, however, sound reasons for giving the judiciary a checkrein upon excessive municipal exuberance in the annexation process.
It is not a matter of giving to any court the responsibility for making
annexation policy, but of authorizing courts to see to it that policy
functions are exercised within the bounds of reason. The latter, perhaps, may be considered a question of law, just as a question of law
is raised for court decision when jury findings of fact are challenged
as beyond rational limits. Here too the law's ubiquitous "reasonable
man" may find a market for his services. Indeed Nebraska, Missouri
and Texas have pointed the way. Proposal II (see Appendix) reflect an attempt to capture in statutory terms the essence of their
experience. The strictly limited access to the courts permitted in
these provisions would seem to be in accord with widely established
practice. 29 Proposals I and II differ not only with respect to annexation itself, but also as to the handling of incidental disputes, i.e., the
allocation of public assets, liabilities and functions between an annexing municipality and any other affected town, city, county or
special district. In each case the respective parties are called upon
to settle such matters by mutual agreement. Failure to do so within
a specified time would require settlement by arbitration in accordance
with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. This device
is suggested as being more expeditious and less costly than resort to
the courts. If strictures like those of Section 9359(2) of the 1932
Code of Tennessee with respect to the settlement of real estate titles
by arbitration be deemed relevant, language could be inserted in the
present proposals to make it clear that the term "property" includes
real property. The basic difference between the settlement provisions
in Proposals I and II is that the former is somewhat more detailed
particularly with respect to the handling of utility and other special
districts. It would accordingly leave less leeway for ad hoc adjustments. The introductory clause in Section 4 of Proposal I is bracketed
to suggest that it might be omitted in the interest of avoiding possible
undue delegation of legislative power. The second bracketed clause
would not appear to be vulnerable on those grounds, but could be
omitted, if the first bracketed clause is included. The provisions with
29. "Most courts... express the view that, where proceedings are not wholly
void, a change of corporate boundaries by annexation ... may not be collaterally attacked." 2 McQUILLIN MUNIcIPAL CoRPORATioNs, 374 (1949) and cases
there cited. There appear to be no Tennessee cases in point. Cf. McCallie v.
Chattanooga, 40 Tenn. 317 (1859); Morris v. Nashville, 74 Tenn. 337 (1880).
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respect to the extinguishment of special districts would not seem to

raise an "impairment of the obligation of contract" or related problem.30
Proposal III (see Appendix) undertakes to avoid both judicial
review and referendum elections. It would permit annexation by ordinance subject to the right of specified objectors to contest the reasonableness thereof by arbitration. This approach, of course, could be
supplemented by such incidental-dispute-settlement provisions as are
found in the foregoing proposals.
Proposal IV (see Appendix) is similar to Proposal II except that
it requires settlement of property and other disputes prior to annexation itself and then permits the "annexing" municipality to drop the
entire project, if the settlement terms are found to be undesirable.
Quaere, whether an arbitral tribunal would undertake to issue an
award that would become effective only at the option of one of the
parties and whether such an award, if issued, would be sufficiently
"mutual" and "final" to be valid?
Another device for dealing with the fringe problem would be to
permit a city to designate a specified area for future annexation and
to extend urban regulations and services into it seriatim in accordance with a pre-arranged program. This staggered approach-to be
considered essentially as an adjunct to other systems-would minimize
the shock for all concerned and would in fact only rationalize and
"legalize" what often happens in practice. This could be named the
onion approach, a layer at a time of municipal services and regulations
being extended into a so-called "service annex" until it and the parent
city were fully merged on the scheduled annexation day. Such gradual, or deferred, annexation might be initiated and confirmed in the
same manner as other municipal extensions except that at the outset
the annexing city would be required to furnish a work-plan for the
gradual extension of all of its normal operations into the new area.
Of course, such a plan ought not to be considered as imposing a rigid
set of contractual obligations. Play should be allowed for unexpected
contingencies, but such things as land use controls, health and safety
regulations, fire and police protection, water supply, public thoroughfares (including storm sewers, street lights and drainage) and sanitation programs could be forecast with reasonable accuracy for completion over a period ranging from a few to as many as twelve or
fifteen years.
The financing of such a system during the change-over interval
could be met by reasonable service charges, revenue bonds (perhaps
convertible into general obligations of the whole community at the
30. First Suburban Utility Dist. v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 128, 133, 146 S.W.2d

948,950 (1941).
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date of annexation) and, if necessary, by general obligation bonds of
the annexing municipality. To expedite the whole integration process,
the "service annex" could be treated as a separate city ward for the
election of a "councilman" to meet with the regular city council for
discussion (if not voting) purposes. 31
31. Another alternative for handling urban growth problems would be the
administrative process. This does not appear to have been tried in the United
States, but much can be said for the submission of annexation controversies
for investigation, hearing, findings of fact and conclusions by a non-partisan
state administrative tribunal of trained specialists. If the judicial and legislative processes are not fully satisfactory in this field, Dean Landis reminds
us that the administrative process is this generation's answer to their inadequacies. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938). In any case the administrative approach has been tried in England and the standards laid down
for the guidance of its Local Government Boundary Commission may be instructive here. Issued by the Minister of Health, Nov. 15, 1945, and approved
by resolution of the House of Commons Dec. 10, 1945, and the House of Lords
Dec. 13, 1945. Reproduced in THE FUTURE OF CrrIEs AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
569-70 (Woodbury Ed. 1953).
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APPENDIX
This appendix consists of four possible approaches to the annexation
problem. It will be noted that each proposal consists of two essentially
different parts-one dealing with annexation, the other with the
settlement of disputes arising out of annexation. In most instances
the various provisions in these four proposals are interchangeable and
may be used in different combinations.

I
Section 1.

Upon its own initiative or upon petition of interested

persons any municipality may by resolution, after notice and public
hearing thereon, propose extension of its corporate limits by the
annexation of territory adjacent to its existing boundaries. Such
resolution, describing the territory proposed for annexation, shall be
published by posting copies of it in at least three public places in
the territory proposed for annexation and in a like number of public
places in the municipality proposing such annexation, and by publishing notice of such resolution at or about the same time in a newspaper of general circulation, if there be one, in such territory and
municipality.
At least sixty and not more than ninety days after such publication
the proposed annexation of territory shall be submitted at the expense
of the proposing municipality for approval or disapproval to the
qualified voters who reside in the territory proposed for annexation
and in the proposing municipality. If a majority of all such voters
voting thereon shall approve, annexation as proposed shall become
effective sixty days after the election date.
[In the alternative the following paragraph might be substituted for the

preceding one. The result would be to eliminate referendum elections
except when they are called for by petition.

If within sixty days after such publication, one-third of the qualified voters residing in such territory proposed for annexation sign
and present to the proposing municipality a petition requesting an
election thereon, such proposed annexation of territory shall at least
thirty and not more than ninety days thereafter be submitted for
approval or disapproval to the qualified voters who reside in the
territory proposed for annexation and in the proposing municipality.
If a majority of all such voters voting thereon shall approve, the
annexation as proposed shall become effective sixty days after the
election date. In the absence of a petition for election as herein
authorized, such annexation as proposed shall become effective at
the expiration of the period within which such petitions may be
presented.]
Section 2. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize annexation proceedings by a smaller municipality with respect to territory
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within the corporate limits of a larger municipality, the terms
"smaller" and "larger" having reference to population.
Section 3. Disputes incidental to an annexation of territory and
relating to the adjustment or allocation of public functions, rights,
duties, property, assets or liabilities between an annexing municipality and any other town, city, or county shall be resolved by written
agreement; provided that, any such dispute not so resolved within a
period of one hundred and eighty days after such annexation shall
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association and judgment upon the award rendered by
the Arbitrator (s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.
Section 4. [Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing] annexation by any municipality of all or any part of the territory served
by any utility, sanitary, school or other public service district shall,
effective two years thereafter, [or at an earlier date specified by the
annexing municipality,] extinguish such district and the annexing
municipality shall succeed to all of its functions, rights, duties, property, assets, liabilities and records, including any authority which
such district may have had to collect taxes, fees or other charges to
maintain its operations or extinguish its obligations.
[In the alternative Section 4 might provide, as follows, merely for partial

or pro rata, rather than complete, extinction of utility and other districts
affected by municipal boundary extensions:

Alternate Section 4. Annexation by any municipality of all
or any part of the territory served by a utility, sanitary, school
or other public service district shall correspondingly extinguish
such district, whereupon the annexing municipality shall succeed
to a fair and equitable share of its assets, liabilities, rights, duties,
functions and records, including any authority which such district
may have had to collect taxes, fees or other charges to maintain its
operations or meet its obligations. If within three months after
such annexation the parties have not agreed in writing as to
what constitutes such fair and equitable share, the matter shall
be referred for settlement by arbitration in accordance with the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association and judgment
upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator (s) may be entered
in any court having jurisdiction thereof.]
Section 5. If any provision of this Act shall be held invalid, the
remaining provisions shall nevertheless continue in operation. If the
application of any provision of this Act to any particular parties or
circumstances shall be held invalid, such provision shall nevertheless
continue in operation with respect to other parties and circumstances.
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II
Section 1. Upon its own initiative or upon petition of interested
persons any municipality may by ordinance, after notice and public
hearing thereon, extend its corporate limits by such annexation of
territory as may reasonably be deemed necessary for the welfare of
the residents of the affected territory and municipality as a whole;
provided that, no ordinance which would extend the corporate limits
of any municipality shall become operative until sixty days after
publication thereof.
Section 2. Any aggrieved resident of territory which is the subject
of an annexation ordinance may prior to the operative date thereof
fie a suit in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and of Part III, Title 2, Chapter 9,
Code of Tennessee 1932 to contest the validity thereof on the ground
that it may not reasonably be deemed necessary for the welfare of
the residents of the affected territory and municipality as a whole
and so constitutes an exercise of power not conferred by law.
If more than one such suit is filed, all of them shall be consolidated
and tried as one in the first court of appropriate jurisdiction in which
suit is filed. If on the evidence introduced upon the issue [of law]
so joined, the court shall find that the contested ordinance is so
clearly unreasonable that no fair-minded men could support it, an
order shall be issued vacating the same. In the absence of such finding an order shall be issued sustaining the validity of such ordinance
which shall then become operative thirty-one days after such judgment is entered unless an abrogating appeal has been taken therefrom.
If suit is not filed as herein authorized, or if fied, is dismissed without judgment on the merits, or if no appeal is taken from a judgment
sustaining the validity of such ordinance, the same shall then become
operative and shall not be subject to contest or attack on the merits
in any legal or equitable proceeding for any cause or reason.
If on appeal judgment shall be against the validity of such ordinance, an order shall be entered vacating the same; otherwise it shall
become operative forthwith by court order and shall not be subject
to contest or attack on the merits in any legal or equitable proceeding
for any cause or reason.
Section 3. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize annexation proceedings by a smaller municipality with respect to territory
within the corporate limits of a larger municipality, the terms
"smaller" and "larger" having reference to population.
Section 4. Upon adoption of an annexation ordinance as hereinabove
authorized an annexing municipality and any affected instrumentality

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

of the State of Tennessee shall attempt to reach agreement in writing
for allocation to the annexing municipality of whatever public functions, property, assets, duties or liabilities of such state instrumentality
that justice and reason may require in the circumstances; provided
that, any such agreement shall recognize the exclusive right of the
annexing municipality, if and to the extent that it may choose, to
perform, or provide for, all customary municipal or utility functions
in any territory which it annexes. Subject to such exclusive right
any such matters upon which the respective parties are not in agreement in writing on the operative date of such annexation ordinance
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association and judgment upon the award
rendered by the Arbitrator (s) may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
Section 5. The term "instrumentality of the State of Tennessee"
as used herein shall include any town, city, county, utility, sanitary,
school or other public service district within the State of Tennessee.
Section 6. If any provision of this act shall be held invalid, the
remaining provisions shall nevertheless continue in operation. If the
application of any provision of this Act to any particular parties or
circumstances shall be held invalid, such provision shall nevertheless
continue in operation with respect to other parties and circumstances.
III
Section 1. Upon its own initiative or upon petition of interested
persons any municipality may by ordinance, after notice and public
hearing thereon, extend its corporate limits by such annexation of
territory as may reasonably be deemed necessary for the welfare of
the residents of the affected territory and municipality as a whole;
provided that, no ordinance which would extend the corporate limits
of any municipality shall become operative until ninety days after
publication thereof.
Section 2. At any time within ninety days after such publication
any town or city with respect to any of its territory proposed for
annexation, or any county with respect to any of its uninc6rporated
territory proposed for annexation may contest, or upon written petition of at least one-third of the qualified voters residing in such territory must contest, such proposed annexation on the merits by initiating an arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. The issue to be so arbitrated shall be whether
the proposed annexation is so clearly unreasonable that no fairminded men could find on balance that the welfare of the whole
affected area would be prompted by it. If the award be in the affirmative, such annexation proposal shall be vacated, and shall not be
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initiated again until after a period of twelve months. If the award
be in the negative the proposed annexation shall be operative forthwith and shall not thereafter be contested on the merits for any
reason. Judgment upon any award rendered in accordance with the
provisions hereof may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof. The method herein provided for contesting the validity of
any annexation proposal shall be exclusive of all other methods of
contest on the merits.
Section 3. If no town, city or county shall in accordance with the
provisions of this act contest a proposed annexation of territory, such
annexation as proposed shall become operative at the expiration of
the period within which such contests may be initiated and shall not
thereafter be contested on the merits for any reason.
[These provisions should be supplemented by something similar to the
provisions in the foregoing proposals relating to settlement of subsidiary
disputes, the outlawing of annexation proceedings by a satellite city against
its parent, and separability.]
IV
Section 1. Upon its own initiative or upon petition of interested
persons any municipality may by ordinance, after notice and public
hearing thereon, designate for annexation any territory that reasonably may be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents of the
affected territory and municipality as a whole. No such ordinance
shall be contested on the merits in any judicial proceedings for any
reason or cause. Upon adoption of such an ordinance it shall be the
duty of the designating municipality and any affected instrumentality
of the State of Tennessee to negotiate for an agreement in writing
for a fair and reasonable allocation between the respective parties
of those public functions, properties, assets, duties or liabilities of
such affected instrumentality of the state which pertain to the territory designated for annexation; provided that, any such agreement.
shall recognize the exclusive right of the designating municipality,
if and to the extent that it may choose, to perform or provide for all
municipal and utility functions in the designated territory upon annexation thereof. Subject to such exclusive right any matters upon
which the respective parties are not in written agreement six months
after adoption of the designating ordinance shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. But no such agreement or arbitral settlement shall become
effective until the annexation to which it relates becomes operative
as hereinafter provided, at which time judgment upon such arbitral
award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Section 2. Within sixty days after such agreement or arbitral settle-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8

ment the designating municipality may by ordinance annex the territory so designated; provided that, no such annexation ordinance
shall become operative until sixty days after publication thereof.
Section 3. Any aggrieved person may prior to the operative date
of any such annexation ordinance file a suit in the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and of Part III, Title 2, Chapter 9, Code of Tennessee 1932 to contest
the validity thereof on the ground that it may not reasonably be
deemed necessary.for the welfare of the residents of the affected
territory and municipality as a whole and so constitutes an exercise
of power not conferred by law.
If more than one such suit is filed, all of them shall be consolidated
and tried as one suit in the first court of appropriate jurisdiction in
which suit is filed. If on the evidence introduced upon the issue [of
law] so joined, the court shall find that the contested ordinance is so
clearly unreasonable that no fair-minded men could support it, an
order shall be issued vacating the same. In the absence of such finding an order shall be issued sustaining the validity of such ordinance
which shall then become operative thirty-one days after such judgment is entered unless an abrogating appeal has been taken therefrom.
If suit is not filed as herein authorized, or if filed, is dismissed without judgment on the merits, or if no appeal is taken from a judgment
sustaining the validity of such ordinance, the same shall then become operative and shall not be subject to contest or attack on the
merits in any legal or equitable proceeding for any cause or reason.
If on appeal judgment shall be against the validity of such ordinance, an order shall be entered vacating the same; otherwise it
shall become operative forthwith by court order and shall not be
subject to contest or attack on the merits in any legal or equitable
proceeding for any cause or reason.
Section 4. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize annexation proceedings by a smaller municipality with respect to territory
within the corporate limits of a larger municipality, the terms
"smaller" and "larger" having reference to population.
Section 5. The term "instrumentality of the State of Tennessee"
as used herein shall include any town, city, county, utility, sanitary,
school or other public service district within the State of Tennessee.
Section 6. If any provision of this act shall be held invalid, the
remaining provisions shall nevertheless continue in operation. If
the application of any provision of this Act to any particular parties
or circumstances shall be held invalid, such provision shall nevertheless continue in operation with respect to other parties and circumstances.

